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The company law landscape in Malaysia has witnessed
a significant change in its insolvency law with the
adoption of two new corporate rescue mechanisms, the
corporate voluntary arrangement and judicial manage-
ment under the Companies Act 2016 (CA 2016), which
has repealed the Companies Act 1965 (CA 1965). Previ-
ously, the insolvency laws under the CA 1965 were
based on the traditional pro-creditor laws of winding
up and receivership, which embodied the liquidation
culture. This article examines the transition of the
insolvency laws in Malaysia from a liquidation culture
under the CA 1965 to a corporate rescue culture under
the CA 2016. It also reviews the necessary changes to
the pro-creditor laws, which are preserved under the
CA 2016 in order to accommodate the pro-debtor laws
with the introduction of the corporate rescue mecha-
nisms, which came into force on March 1, 2018.
Through comparative and critical analysis of similar
laws in the United Kingdom and Singapore, this article
argues that while the corporate rescue mechanisms are
regarded as pro-debtor however the review reveals that
the position of secured creditors are impeding its appli-
cation and reforms ought to be considered.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2017, the Companies Act 1965 (CA 1965) in Malaysia was repealed by the Com-
panies Act 2016 (CA 2016). The objectives of enacting the CA 2016 are to modernise the law in
Malaysia relating to companies accompanied by a reduction in the costs of doing business,1 and
at the same time, to provide a framework to facilitate the rescue of financially distressed compa-
nies.2 The corporate rescue mechanisms are found in Division 8 of Part III in the CA 2016 and
are in the form of Corporate Voluntary Arrangement (CVA),3 and Judicial Management (JM),4
which are effective on March 1, 2018. With the introduction of these two corporate rescue
mechanisms, it is expected that Malaysian insolvency laws will attain the modern international
standards pertaining to corporate rescue, where statutory mechanisms are available to facilitate
the rescue of those companies whose failures are caused by temporary financial problems, but
which are still economically viable.5
The corporate rescue mechanisms were introduced based on reforms recommended by the
Corporate Law Reform Committee (CLRC),6 which was set up by the Companies Commission
Malaysia (CCM) on December 17, 2003. The CLRC produced several reports for law reform,
which included a Consultative Document on Reviewing the Corporate Insolvency Regime—
The Proposal for a Corporate Rehabilitation Framework [No. 10] (CD No. 10), published in
2007 and which recommended the corporate rescue mechanisms.7 With the introduction of cor-
porate rescue mechanisms in the form of CVA and JM, the insolvency law for companies in
Malaysia has apparently changed from that of a liquidation culture,8 under the CA 1965, to that
of a corporate rescue culture,9 under the CA 2016. The term, 'corporate rescue' owes its origin
to the United States (US) as a term used:
“to describe measures taken for the rescue of companies as an alternative to their
dissolution.”10
This trend in insolvency law in the world on the adoption of a corporate rescue culture has
been described as:
“a marked shift from liquidation and creditor wealth maximisation to corporate rescue and
value preservation.”11
Notwithstanding that the objectives of the corporate rescue mechanisms under the CA 2016
are to facilitate the rescue of distressed companies, this article will conclude that more reforms
are needed to overcome the veto rights of creditors to enable those objectives to be attained.
2 | PRO-DEBTOR AND PRO-CREDITOR LAWS
The inspiration for a corporate rescue culture, as embraced by the United Kingdom (UK) and
Singapore insolvency laws, came from the US Chapter 11, which is regarded as a pro-debtor
law.12 The main features of a pro-debtor law embodied in Chapter 11 provide for: the process to
be initiated by the company as a form of protection against its creditors; the retention of the
existing management, which will draw up a reorganisation proposal for the creditors' consider-
ation; a moratorium to restrain the creditors from enforcing their claim; super priority financ-
ing to assist in the reorganisation of the company; and a cramming down of the secured
creditors' enforcement of their security to enable the reorganisation proposal to proceed.13 On
the other hand, the liquidation culture with its pro-creditor laws would have one or more of the
following features14: the entitlement of creditors to wind up a debtor company on default of
payment; the entitlement of the secured creditor to enforce his security including the
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appointment of receivers to realise the security to settle his claim; and the application of the
pari passu principle15 for an equal distribution of the debtor company's assets among the
unsecured creditors.
3 | BACKGROUND OF THE COMPANIES ACTS
3.1 | The CA 1965
The CA 1965 was largely based on the model provided by the UK Companies Act 1948 (UKCA
1948) and the Australian Uniform Companies Act 1961 (AUCA 1961), a position which was
acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Indo Malaysia Engineering Co Bhd v Muniandy
Rengasamy & Co.16 On April 15, 1966, the CA 1965 repealed and replaced the Companies Ordi-
nance 1946, which had applied the Straits Settlements Companies Ordinance 1940 (1940 Ordi-
nance) with modifications to the whole of Malaya.17 The 1940 Ordinance was itself largely
based on the UK Companies Act 1929.18
The history of company law in Malaysia followed closely that of UK company law since it
was a transplant of UK company law up until the CA 1965. Even though the CA 1965 was mod-
elled after the AUCA 1961, the link between the CA 1965 and UK company law was not
completely severed at all, since the Australian Act was itself based on the UKCA 1948.19 Not-
withstanding that Singapore had split from Malaysia when the CA 1965 came into force, the
Singapore Companies Act 1967 (SCA) was in many aspects similar to the provisions in the CA
1965, despite the subsequent amendments in both Acts.20
3.2 | The CA 2016
The CA 2016 replicated many of the insolvency provisions in the CA 1965 relating to winding
up and receivership, but some significant changes were made so as to accommodate the novel
corporate rescue mechanisms, the CVA and JM. The CVA is based on similar laws applicable in
the UK, while the JM procedure is modelled on the Singapore law,21 which was itself borrowed
from the administration regime in the UK.22
4 | CORPORATE INSOLVENCY AND CREDITORS
It is usual for a private company limited by shares to commence its business with its initial capi-
tal contribution from its shareholders, but it is inevitable that, in order to continue its opera-
tions or to pursue any plans for expansion, it will have to resort to borrowing from financial
institutions and the securing of credit from its suppliers (also known as its trade creditors) such
as deferred terms of payment for goods and services.23 According to Goode: “a world without
credit is impossible to imagine”,24 and credit is defined as a “contractual deferment of debt.”.25
In the event of default of payment of the debt, the creditors' recourse is directed against the
company, since shareholders are normally shielded by virtue of the concepts of separate legal
personality of the company and the limited liability of the shareholders.26
In general, creditors are grouped into those holding security (secured creditors) and those
without the benefit of such securities (unsecured creditors). Both the CA 1965 and the CA 2016
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allude to the term of “secured creditor,” but offer no definition for it. Instead it was left to the
courts, which have held that provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 1967 (now known as the Insol-
vency Act 1967) (IA 1967),27 on the definition of “secured creditor,” can apply to matters per-
taining to winding up of companies.28 Section 2 of the IA 1967 defined a “secured creditor”
to mean:
“A person holding a mortgage, charge or lien on the property of the debtor or any part
thereof as a security for a debt due to him from the debtor but shall not include a plaintiff in
any action who has attached the property of the debtor before judgment.”
Thus, a creditor is regarded as a secured creditor only if he held security on the property or
assets of the debtor at the commencement of the liquidation.29 Property may either be moveable
or immoveable. Moveable property is defined to mean property other than immoveable prop-
erty and the latter is defined to mean land and any interest in, right over or benefit arising or to
arise out of land.30 The secured creditor enjoys an advantage in law over unsecured creditors in
that the security held by the secured creditor is unaffected by the liquidation of the debtor and
he may therefore realise the security to settle his claim against the debtor and if after realisa-
tion, there is any excess, then he is obliged to forward it to the liquidator.31
The difference between a mortgage and a charge in the definition of “secured creditor” prin-
cipally involves a transfer of title in land: in a mortgage, the borrower's land is transferred to
the lender subject to an equity of redemption which on full payment of the debt, the lender is
obliged to transfer the land back to the borrower and in the case of a charge, the land is not
transferred to the lender but constitute an encumbrance on the title which on default of pay-
ment, the lender is entitled to foreclose the land by auction to settle the debt.32 A charge over
property in the form of land is registered under the National Land Code 1965 (NLC),33 which
governs matters pertaining to land. The holder of such a registered charge over the land of a
borrower under the NLC, which is registered in the relevant land office is regarded as a secured
creditor.34 While the mortgage as a security for land is not recognized under the NLC,35 it may
still be relevant as a security for other moveable property such as aircrafts,36 and ships.37
Another form of charge granted by a company is found in a debenture, a contractual docu-
ment between a lender and the borrower, which apart from being an acknowledgement of the
indebtedness of the borrower often contains charges over the property of the borrower.38 The
nature of the charge can be in the forms of fixed and floating charges over the property of the
borrower, which do not involve the transfer of ownership of that property.39 The holder of a
debenture is a secured creditor, but there is an important distinction to be made between a fixed
and a floating charge. While a fixed charge attaches to and binds the specific property, a floating
charge hovers over certain types of property, such as the goods of the borrower who remains in
a legal position to transact and give good title to those goods until a contractually determined
event, such as a default of payment of the loan or the appointment of a receiver or receiver and
manager, which when triggered then converts the floating charge into a fixed charge.40 This
conversion of the floating charge into a fixed charge is also known as an automatic crystalliza-
tion of the floating charge.41 It has been noted that the unique nature of a floating charge allows
the holder of such a charge, which covers the whole or substantially the whole of the borrower's
company to appoint a receiver or receiver and manager to displace the management of the bor-
rower's company.42
In contrast to a secured creditor, an unsecured creditor of a company has higher exposure to
risk due to the absence of holding a security of the company as a collateral for the debt.43 The
security of the company held by the secured creditor offers a form of control over the assets,
which constitute the security and is available to the secured creditor to enforce his claim against
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the company in the event of default in the payment of the debt.44 However, both sets of credi-
tors are empowered by the CA 1965 to present a winding up petition against the debtor45 and it
has been observed that:
“the bulk of the reported cases in respect of court winding up involve petitions presented by
creditors of a company.”46
It has been noted by Farrar and Hannigan47 that the secured creditors are invariably bank-
ing and financial institutions while the unsecured creditors are usually trade creditors who sup-
ply goods on credit to the company.
5 | THE CORPORATE INSOLVENCY FRAMEWORK UNDER
THE CA 1965
In dealing with corporate insolvency, the CA 1965 provides debt recovery remedies for creditors
of distressed companies in the form of winding up,48 and the appointment of receiver or
receiver and manager.49 The corporate insolvency framework in the CA 1965 and the SCA were
based on the AUCA 1961, which has its roots in the UKCA 1948 and its predecessor statutes in
the UK.50 In line with the liquidation culture adopted from the UKCA 1948 and the AUCA
1961, the provisions on winding up in the CA 1965 have features of a pro-creditor law,51 by
empowering creditors to wind up a company on default of payment of debts and an equal distri-
bution of the assets of the company among its unsecured creditors.52
The other feature of a pro-creditor law is concerned with the rights of a secured creditor,
which is exhibited in the law on receivership where the secured creditor is empowered to
appoint a receiver or receiver and manager to act as an agent of the company to realise the
secured property to settle the indebtedness of the company to the secured creditor.53 This mech-
anism allows the secured creditor to maintain control over the secured property.
6 | WINDING UP
6.1 | Types of winding up
The winding up of companies has been associated with the ending of the statutory life of com-
panies.54 The CA 1965 provided two main categories of winding up, being a voluntary winding
up and a compulsory winding up (also known as a court-ordered winding up),55 which is repli-
cated in the CA 2016.56 The voluntary winding up is instituted at the instance of the members
of a company by passing a resolution to wind up the company where it is solvent,57 but it may
be converted into a creditors' winding up if the initial process commenced by the members
lacked a directors' declaration of solvency or where the initial liquidator appointed by the mem-
bers is of the opinion that the company is insolvent.58 However as noted earlier, the bulk of
reported cases on winding up of companies belong to the category of compulsory winding up.59
6.2 | Winding up under the CA 1965
In section 218(1) of the CA 1965, 11 grounds are provided for the winding up of companies.60
The most common ground for a company to be wound up is its inability to pay its debts as they
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fall due.61 The CA 1965 provides for the commencement of the winding up to be at the time of
filing the application for the winding up and not when the winding up order is made.62
6.2.1 | Unable to pay its debts
The inability of a company to pay its debts as they fall due is not only the most common ground
to support an application for winding up but it is also a simple ground to be satisfied.63 The sim-
plicity of this ground is facilitated by a deeming provision in the CA 1965, which allows for the
ground to be satisfied by the failure of a debtor company to pay a stated sum in a demand in
three weeks after a service of the demand.64 Until the CA 1965 was repealed on January 31,
2017 by the CA 2016, only an amount in excess of MYR 500 was required to be stated in the
demand during the entire period of operation of the CA 1965.65 On the other hand, for personal
bankruptcy, the IA 1967 had increased the minimum debt amount for the presentation of a
bankruptcy petition from MYR 10,000 to MYR 30,000.66 It is now MYR 50,000.67 The compari-
son between the minimum debt amount for winding up and personal bankruptcy shows the rel-
ative ease in which a company is deemed insolvent for winding up purposes,68 but does not
reflect the effect of inflation on the value of the ringgit from 1965 until the repeal of the CA
2016 in January 2017, a period of over 50 years.69
6.2.2 | Commencement of winding up
It would be quite reasonable to regard the commencement of winding up as the date of an order
of court granting the winding up but for the short phrase in section 219(2) of the CA 1965,
which reads as follows:
“In any other case the winding up shall be deemed to have commenced at the time of the
presentation of the petition for the winding up.”
In its early days, section 219(2) gave rise to two conflicting decisions in the High Court. In
the first case, Pembinaan KSY Sdn Bhd v Lian Seng Properties Sdn Bhd & Anor (KSY case),70
Lim Beng Choon J appeared to regard section 219(2) of the CA 1965 as applicable even to situa-
tions, where a winding up petition has been filed but the granting of a winding up order has
not been decided.71 In the second case, Development & Commercial Bank Bhd v Kredin Sdn Bhd
(Kredin case),72 based on similar facts involving a filing of a winding up petition against the
debtor company and the intended execution of judgment process by a third party, VC George J
(as he then was) declined to follow the decision in the KSY case.73 His Lordship opined that the
deeming provisions in section 219(2), being a statutory fiction, only took effect on the making
of a winding up order and not merely upon the filing of a winding up petition.
On appeal (Kredin case [Appeal]), the Court of Appeal by the decision of Siti Norma
Yaakob JCA (as she then was), in allowing the appeal, found favour with the decision in the
KSY case, that is, a winding up is deemed to commence at the time of filing of the winding
up presentation, irrespective of whether or not a winding up order is ultimately made.74
This decision has been approved by the Federal Court, without much arguments, in the case
of Savant-Asia Sdn Bhd v Sunway PMI-Pile Construction Sdn Bhd.75 The decision in the
Kredin case (Appeal), was not shared by judicial decisions in other jurisdictions,76 based on
provisions in pari materia with section 219(2) of the CA 1965 and the views of both local
and foreign commentators,77 especially one local commentator who had appropriately
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commented on the lack of arguments that had been raised and considered by the Court of
Appeal in arriving at its decision.78
6.2.3 | Ease of winding up companies under the CA 1965
The CA 1965 with its insolvency framework, especially with the very low unchanged limit of
MYR 500 at which a winding up petition may be filed over a period of over 50 years, meant that
many debtor companies were subject to the threat of winding up proceedings. The courts' inter-
pretation of section 219(2) of the CA 1965 on the commencement of winding up would also
contribute to the hardship encountered by a debtor company facing a winding up petition being
filed in court. This is exacerbated by the strict requirement upheld by the court that the winding
up petition must be advertised in newspapers, regardless of the damage caused to the debtor
company, failing which the petition would be dismissed.79 The advertisement would then
enable banks and suppliers to take notice of it. An obvious action taken by banks would be to
terminate any banking facilities granted to the company, since the commencement of winding
up, interpreted by the courts as a filing of a winding up petition, would constitute one of the
events of default for the contractual agreement pertaining to the banking facilities.80
Even where no banking facilities are involved, yet the business of a company may be crip-
pled by the banks' action of freezing the bank accounts of the company after having been
apprised of the filing of the winding up petition through the advertisement, which has been
deemed a mandatory procedure by the courts. In the case of Malayan Banking Berhad v
Emaslink New Pacific Management Sdn Bhd and Anor,81 the Court of Appeal held that the bank
was legally entitled to freeze the bank account of its customer after having read of the advertise-
ment in a newspaper on the filing of a winding up petition against the customer.
In insolvency law, the date of commencement of winding up is significant, as laws are in
place to ensure that the assets of the company are intact in relation to that date by providing
that any disposition of them is void so as to enable an equitable distribution, after its realiza-
tion, among the unsecured creditors.82
7 | RECEIVERSHIP
7.1 | Nature of receivership
Unlike public companies, private companies are unable to source funds from the public to
finance its operations.83 Instead, the private companies usually opt for sourcing, either from its
members via the issuing of shares, or from financial institutions such as banks.84 In recognition
of the importance of the latter activity to a company, the ability of a company to borrow is auto-
matically provided in the statutes governing companies.85
In giving out loans to private companies with its separate legal personality and the limited
liability of its shareholders, it is usual for financial institutions to require security from the com-
panies.86 In addition, those financial institutions will have three main concerns over the secu-
rity taken: first, whether it is effective in the event of the insolvency of the company; secondly,
whether the priority of the security will prevail in the event of a conflict with a third party who
has a proprietary interest in it; and, thirdly, whether the security can be enforced in the event
of the company facing insolvency proceedings.87
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Those concerns of the financial institutions are addressed by including a power to appoint a
receiver or receiver and manager in the debenture containing a floating charge, which as a form
of security is granted only by companies.88 A typical debenture, apart from containing an
acknowledgement of indebtedness of the company, is comprised charges in the form of a fixed
charge on the specific assets and a floating charge over assets, which are “ambulatory and
shifting in its nature” such as its book debts and stock in trade.89 The nature of a floating charge
was examined by the Court of Appeal in the case of Affin Bank Bhd v Malayan Banking Bhd
(Affin Bank case),90 with the view that it is comprised three characteristics: first, it floats or
hovers over the present or future assets of the company and does not, unlike a fixed charge, fas-
ten onto it; secondly, during this period, the company is legally able to dispose or trade or deal
in those assets; and, thirdly, certain events when triggered will terminate its floating status and
convert it automatically into a fixed charge.91
The third characteristic of an automatic conversion of the floating charge into a fixed
one is better known as automatic crystallization,92 which is linked to the event of receiver-
ship of companies. The automatic crystallization clause is now part of the standard clauses
found in debentures93 and will include crystallization events, such as when a company is
being wound up or on the commencement of winding up,94 cessation of a company's busi-
ness, appointment of a liquidator or a receiver or a receiver and manager,95 which on the
happening on any of the stipulated events will automatically convert the floating charge
into a fixed charge.96 The debenture as a security device serves to allay the concerns of
secured creditors, especially where the debtor company is insolvent, with its features, such
as the automatic crystallization clause, the requirement of registration of the debenture
with the CCM, which amounts to constructive notice of it,97 and the provisions for appoint-
ment of a receiver or receiver and manager. The latter event, known as receivership, is an
exercise of the powers by the secured creditor as a holder of the debenture to appoint profes-
sionals as receiver or receiver and manager,98 in contrast to an appointment by court,99
which will pave the way for the realization of the secured assets to repay the debts due from
the company to the secured creditor.100
7.2 | Receivership under the CA 1965
The CA 1965 provides for appointment of receivers by court,101 but out of court appointments
are made through express powers incorporated into debentures by the secured creditors.102 The
provisions governing receivership are contained in Part VIII of the CA 1965, which are mod-
elled on the UKCA 1948 and the AUCA 1961.103 The appointed persons are termed as receiver
or receiver and manager (R & M), which are extensively mentioned in the Act, but for which a
definition is lacking.104
The distinction between the two positions of a receiver and a R & M lies in the scope of
power granted by the debenture and the latter position represents a common appointment by
debenture holders.105 Under the CA 1965, the source of the powers of a R & M is the debentures
under which they are appointed.106 The R & M, by virtue of powers granted by the debenture,
has a principal duty to his appointor to realise the properties with a view to settling the debts of
the company to the debenture holders. After all, the purpose of having the debenture is to pro-
tect the interest of the debenture holder who had lent money to the company.107 The anoma-
lous position of the R & M lies in his appointment by the debenture holder, but his designation
as an agent of the company in the debenture.108
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8 | THE CA 2016 AND THE LIQUIDATION CULTURE
Under the CA 1965, the liquidation culture prevails in the absence of any corporate rescue
mechanism with the availability of winding up and receivership processes, which have the fea-
tures of pro-creditor laws.109
8.1 | Winding up under the CA 2016
The winding up laws under the CA 2016 are in most instances the same as that under the CA 1965,
but two significant changes have reduced the harshness of the previous law for debtor companies:
8.1.1 | The “unable to pay its debts” definition and the threshold limit
Under the CA 2016, the threshold limit is now MYR 10,000,110 as compared to the previous
limit of MYR 500 under the CA 1965. While the increase is considerable, the amount still pales
in comparison to the present limit of MYR 50,000 for personal bankruptcy under the IA
1967.111 Another factor to note is that the increase of MYR 10,000 from MYR 500 in the limit
has only been made after a period of over 50 years.
8.1.2 | Commencement of winding up
In line with the recommendations of the CLRC, after having noted the legislative changes made
in Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore,112 the CA 2016 now provides that the commence-
ment of winding up is the date of the winding up order granted by the court.113
8.2 | Receivership under the CA 2016
The law on receivership was reviewed by the CLRC in conjunction with its proposal for laws
introducing corporate rescue.114 Based on the recommendations by the CLRC, two significant
changes to the law on receivership were introduced to the CA 2016, which are as follows:
1 Codification of agency status
The present law stipulates that the R &M is an agent of the company and not an agent of the deben-
ture holder, the secured creditor, unless the debenture appointing him to that position otherwise pro-
vides.115 This is to remove any doubts as to his position in the absence of express provision in the
debenture orwhichwas inadvertently left out,116 a clear indication on the need to establish the position of
aR&M in order for him to performhis functions and to exercise his powers on behalf of the company.117
2 Codification of powers of receivers and R & Ms
The CLRC saw the need to establish and standardise a minimum set of powers for receivers
and R & M rather than having to refer to each debenture, which may differ from case to case
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resulting in ambiguities being referred to the courts for deliberation.118 The law now provides
for a minimum set of powers for receivers and R & Ms, which may be overridden by specific
and inconsistent powers in the debenture.119
With the codification of the agency status of receivers and R & Ms and the provision of a
minimum set of powers, the CA 2016 has reinforced the law of receivership. Receivership is
generally regarded as a pro-creditor process. However, in practical terms, its principal objective
is to ensure payment of the company's debt to the debenture holder or the secured creditor
only, regardless of its adverse consequences on the business of the company or other creditors,
with many cases ending in liquidation,120 a position which remains unchanged under the CA
2016.121 In any case, the event of receivership will result in a removal of the powers of the com-
pany to deal with the secured property, either under a fixed charge originally or after its crystal-
lization from a floating charge, a termination of services of employees, unless the employment
is continued by the R & M, and rendering previous suppliers into unsecured creditors.122
The new liquidation culture with amendments made to both the laws on winding up and
receivership now co-exists with the novel corporate rescue culture in the CA 2016. The next
part looks at the corporate rescue culture in Malaysia and discusses the corporate rescue con-
cept embedded in the CA 2016 with a focus on issues relating to secured creditors.
9 | A CORPORATE RESCUE CULTURE
9.1 | Purpose of corporate rescue
The earlier insolvency framework in Malaysia cultivated the liquidation culture with winding
up as the only viable option for insolvent companies.123 As for receivership, which is reserved
for secured creditors, the fate of the companies also lies in liquidation after the assets of the
debtor company are sold off to settle the debts due to the secured creditors, since the companies
are then left practically with nothing much for the unsecured creditors.124
The modern insolvency laws in Malaysia and other jurisdictions recognize that not all insol-
vent companies should be liquidated, unless they are no longer economically viable.125 One of
the tests of insolvency is based on cash-flow, resulting in a company being regarded as insol-
vent, if its financial situation is such that, although it has assets and a viable business, it is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due.126 Similarly, the Cork Report viewed the inability to pay
debts as the moment that insolvency has set in, stating that:
“In practical terms insolvency arises at the moment when debts cannot be met as they fall
due.”127
This ability to pay debts as they fall due is a common ground in Malaysia for a winding up
action.128 During this period of insolvency, the lack of coordination on the part of unsecured
creditors will lead to a disorganised and frenzied rush to collect the debts, inevitably leading to
the demise of the debtor company by way of liquidation, even if the going concern value of the
debtor company or its assets may be higher.129 The end result for the unsecured creditors is an
inefficient return on their claims against the debtor company.130 The failure of a company will
also result in termination of the services of its employees, non-payment to suppliers and will
contribute to a lower growth in the economy of a country.131 However, though an “insufficiency
of liquid assets does not necessarily indicate inability to pay”, this factor is not taken into
account in the cash-flow insolvency test, since what matters is the inability to pay the debts
when due.132 According to Mokal, a company which is facing temporary cash-flow problems
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may still have a viable business, that is a financially distressed company may still be economi-
cally viable with its assets potentially able to realise a higher value as a going concern compared
to when it is liquidated or the assets are broken up for realization in the event of
receivership.133
The notable reforms to insolvency laws in the form of adoption of a corporate rescue culture
were first mooted in the Cork Report, owing to economic recession in the UK during the period
from the late 1970s until the early part of the 1980s, which led to an increase in the number of
corporate insolvency cases.134 This report marked an important contribution to the changes to
be sought in the area of corporate insolvency by drawing attention to the effects of insolvency
on other stakeholders other than the debtor company and its creditors as well as the contribu-
tion of the preservation of viable companies to the growth of the country.135 It then proceeded
to propose, amongst other things, a procedure by which an administrator is appointed by the
court to manage the insolvent company and most importantly, resulting in an order of morato-
rium on the company's creditors, with a whole chapter devoted to this procedure.136 Another
proposed rescue procedure was to avail the insolvent company of a formal and binding but out
of court arrangement, with the approval of its creditors.137 Both the former and latter proce-
dures are represented in the UK Insolvency Act 1986 (UKIA 1986) as administration and com-
pany voluntary arrangements (UKCVA), respectively.138 According to Goode, those proposals
“evolved what has become known as the rescue culture”, with its objective of rescuing the
insolvent companies by rehabilitating them to achieve profitable trading and escape from the
demise of liquidation.139
9.2 | Concept of corporate rescue in the CA 2016
Corporate rescue of distressed private companies under the CA 2016 refers to rescue carried out
in a formal manner, which may be achieved by utilising the corporate rescue mechanisms
under the CA 2016, that is the CVA or the JM, or perhaps even a Scheme of Arrangement
(SOA), which was previously used under the CA 1965 to rehabilitate companies. The CLRC had
based its recommendations for the introduction of those corporate rescue mechanisms with ref-
erence to the Cork Report and the laws in the UK and Singapore.
Corporate rescue has been defined by Belcher as an exercise which represents “a major
intervention necessary to avert eventual failure of the company”,140 that is, to ward off a liqui-
dation of the distressed company, by way of a company rescue or business rescue.141 However,
that definition does not spell out the expected or preferred methods of securing a corporate res-
cue as to whether it will take the form of a company rescue or business rescue. What this
amounts to is that the rescue intervention serves the purpose of avoiding a failure of the dis-
tressed company, but without necessarily restoring it to its pre-insolvency position.142 In rec-
ommending the introduction of the corporate rescue mechanisms in Malaysia, the CLRC stated
that a corporate rescue framework is able to provide the “preservation of the economic value of
the company as a going concern for all stakeholders in that business” and in the event of the
company's insolvency then at least an “increasing returns to all creditors.”143
The ideal outcome of a corporate rescue is a company rescue, also described as a pure res-
cue, which amounts to the restoration of the company's financial position to its previous
healthy status with the management and workforce intact.144 However, it has been observed
that this goal is difficult to achieve in practice.145 A more realistic outcome is a business rescue,
which is a sale of the business of the company as a going concern sale or partial going concern
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sale,146 which can be achieved through the JM process. Another form of corporate rescue may
be achieved through the CVA by saving the distressed company in whole or in part with the
agreed composition of its debts by its unsecured creditors, thus enabling the company to con-
tinue its business and preserving the employment of its employees.147
In the UK, where the rescue mechanisms similar to the CVA and JM are available in the
form of the UKCVA and administration, respectively, it was observed by Campbell that, in most
cases, major “surgery” will be performed in order to rescue the distressed company, which will
result in the “survivor” company retaining its old name, but which is in many aspects different,
including changes often made in its management and operations.148 Parry alluded to the term,
“corporate rescue” as rather misleading, as it is capable of referring to a pure rescue or alterna-
tively a preservation of the value of the business of the distressed company in order to offer a
better return to its creditors as opposed to a liquidation.149
10 | THE CORPORATE RESCUE MECHANISMS AND
SECURED CREDITORS
10.1 | Malaysia
While the CVA and the JM in the CA 2016 were introduced as corporate rescue mechanisms
based on the recommendations of the CLRC, however the position of secured creditors remain
intact with priority being given to the security of receivership, which may not be compatible
with corporate rescue.
10.1.1 | CVA
The CVA is modelled on the UKCVA but is subject to four restrictions on its application.150 The
first three restrictions refer to companies which are public companies,151 licensed financial
institutions,152 and companies which are subject to the Capital Markets and Securities Act 2007
(CMSA 2007).153 These share a common feature with the UKCVA with the objective of
restricting its availability to smaller businesses, that is, private companies.154 However, its prac-
tical use is significantly handicapped by the fourth restriction where it is not available to “a
company which creates a charge over its property or any of its undertaking”,155 because in
Malaysia, financial institutions would, more often than not, require even private companies in
seeking loans to provide securities in the form of a charge over its property or undertakings.156
Despite the fourth restriction, it is provided in section 400(4) that a secured creditor may
consent to include his security in the proposal for consideration by unsecured creditors, a posi-
tion similar to that in the UK.157 This rather odd and puzzling position may be due to the adop-
tion of similar laws in the UK, but then adding a conflicting and irreconcilable fourth
restriction, which would make the CVA quite difficult to implement.
10.1.2 | JM
The JM is based on the Judicial Management procedure in Singapore (SJM). Its application is
not available to companies which are financial institutions and those subjected to the CMSA
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2007.158 While its scope of coverage is wider than the CVA, with its availability open to both
public and private companies, but for those companies with secured creditors, its usage may be
vetoed by those creditors.159 In the first decision on JM in Malaysia, Leadmont Development
Sdn Bhd v Infra Segi Sdn Bhd,160 the court alluded to the powers of a secured creditor to veto
the JM application, but only if the two conditions in section 409 are satisfied.161 The first condi-
tion is where a receiver or R & M has been or will be appointed by a secured creditor followed
by a second condition that that creditor is opposing the JM application. Section 409 differs from
the model provision in the SCA,162 which is read disjunctively in view of the word, “or”
between the two conditions, but that difference is now legislatively removed.163 The amended
section 409 allows a secured creditor to veto the JM application if either of the two conditions is
satisfied, which makes it easier for a secured creditor to object to the application.
However, the drastic effect of section 409 is tempered by the court finding that the “public
interest” aspect of rescuing the distressed company can outweigh the objection of the secured
creditors.164 The attempts in resorting to 'public interest' to overcome the objections of the
secured creditors have been limited to two reported cases in Singapore, which were unsuccess-
ful.165 It is also not helped by the absence of any definition for “public interest” in both the Acts
in Singapore and Malaysia, which is left to judicial determination on a case to case basis.166
10.2 | The UK
The UKCVA concerns a debt arrangement proposal by a company, whether distressed or not,
to be considered by unsecured creditors, but it will include the secured creditor if he has con-
sented in the inclusion of his security in the proposal. However, unlike the position in Malaysia,
having a secured creditor does not prevent the application of the corporate rescue mechanism.
The voluntary compromise with the creditors, for extra time to pay their debts or for a portion
of it to be waived,167 allows the debtor company to continue to trade, although it may involve
closure of underperforming business or stores, reduction in rentals, and changes in the manage-
ment team.168
As for the administration regime, a concern that it was not sufficiently utilised due to the
absence of rescue-orientated elements in the law has witnessed the introduction of the Enter-
prise Act 2002 (UKEA 2002),169 which has, inter alia, abolished receivership,170 a favourite
mode of the secured creditors for securing repayment of its debts from the distressed compa-
nies.171 The UK Government noted its concern in the White Paper preceding the Act that the
administration procedure was underutilized due to the ability of the secured creditor with a
floating charge in appointing a receiver, which will have the effect of dismantling the business
of the distressed company and impeding any rescue plans.172 It was also observed by the courts
that this change was consistent with the intention not to frustrate the rescue culture, which
seeks to preserve viable business.173
10.3 | Singapore
The SJM, many of whose provisions were adopted in the JM in Malaysia, provides for two mea-
sures to curtail the powers of the secured creditors in vetoing its application. Both measures
were left to the wisdom of the courts, first on the balancing of the interests of the secured credi-
tors and those of the unsecured creditors174 and, secondly, on the element of “public interest,”
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which is adopted in the CA 2016.175 The first measure was introduced in 2017 to improve the
SJM as a corporate rescue process.176 The new law now shifts the burden onto the secured cred-
itor to show that the granting of the SJM application would prejudice his interests “dispropor-
tionately greater” than those of the unsecured creditors.177
11 | CONCLUSIONS
Prior to the CA 2016, the corporate insolvency laws in Malaysia only offered winding up or
receivership without any corporate rescue mechanisms to financially distressed companies.178
The previous corporate insolvency framework adopted a liquidation culture. The embedding of
the CVA and the JM as corporate rescue mechanisms in the CA 2016 heralded a step towards
an adoption of a corporate rescue culture in Malaysia, which was assisted with an amelioration
of the previously harsh laws on winding up. However, the laws on receivership under the previ-
ous regime were fortified in the CA 2016.
While the CA 2016 with its CVA and JM, a position not unlike that of the UKIA 1986, which is
fundamental to the rescue culture,179 provides a platform for corporate rescue in Malaysia, however,
the usefulness of the CVA and JM as corporate rescue mechanisms are hampered by its limitations,
since they are either not available (as in the case of CVA in private companies with secured credi-
tors) or may be vetoed (in the JM process, by secured creditors with floating charges and the right
to appoint receivers). The secured creditor-friendly laws are incompatible with the corporate rescue
culture.180 As observed by Omar, the laws on insolvency and corporate rescue in the world do not
remain stagnant but continue to evolve.181 Malaysia having adopted the corporate rescue laws from
the UK and Singapore made its first amendment to the CA 2016 in 2019.182 It was a missed oppor-
tunity to consider and incorporate the necessary changes in regard to secured creditors as was done
in the legislation in both the UK and Singapore.
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